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ABSTRACT
Tracking is widely used in secondary schools around the world. Some countries put more
emphasis on the use of performance to place students into tracks (e.g. the Netherlands), while
in other countries parents have more influence on the track their child will go to (e.g. Germany).
This article examines whether selection into tracks based on performance has an effect on the
relation between tracking and student performance and educational opportunities. Using data
from the Programme for International Student Assessment for around 185 000 students in 31
countries, different estimation models are compared. The results indicate that a highly differ-
entiated system is best for performance when schools always consider prior performance when
deciding on student acceptance. In systems with a few tracks, there is no such impact. Equality of








Tracking students in secondary school into distinct
educational programmes of different ability levels
influences students in a number of ways: In tracked
systems, students are separated into tracks with dif-
ferent peers, different curricula and different tea-
chers, while in non-tracked systems in theory all
students share their learning environment. Previous
research does not show consistent positive or nega-
tive effects of tracking on student performance (e.g.
Hanushek and Woessmann 2006; Ariga and
Brunello, 2007; Elk, van Der Steeg, and Webbink
2011). While regarding the inequality of outcomes
between students with different parental background
(PB; which captures among other things parental
education and income), it is often found that track-
ing reinforces inequality (e.g. Ammermueller 2005;
Schuetz, Ursprung, and Woessmann 2008).
Although also on inequality there is no consensus
(e.g. Walldinger 2006; Brunello and Checchi 2007).
However, a possible explanation for the mixed
results found in the literature is that none of the
previous papers has looked at how tracking is imple-
mented. For instance, it could be that tracking has
different effects on student performance and
inequality depending on how students are selected
into tracks. Both the possible unwanted effect of an
increased effect of PB, and the possible positive or
negative effect on student learning are dependent on
how track placement is done: If track placement is
done purely on ability levels then the effect of PB is
reduced since parents cannot influence track choice
directly, while tracks are homogenous in the ability
composition which could increase learning. If track
placement is not done based on ability, but for
instance on PB, then increased learning might not
happen since the tracks are not homogenous in
ability and the effect of PB naturally increases.
The aim of this article is to investigate whether
using prior performance to select students into tracks
has an effect on the relation between tracking and
student performance and between tracking and edu-
cational opportunities. Tracking does not vary within
education systems. However, in most countries,
school principals are often free in how they select
students into tracks. We use data on whether school
principals consider prior performance in accepting
the students to the school from the Programme for
International Student Assessment (PISA) 2009 for 31
OECD countries to investigate our question. We find
that students who attend schools whose principals
consider prior performance in a highly differentiated
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed here.
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system have higher test scores and a lower impact of
PB than those in a comprehensive system. When
comparing different estimation models we find it
unlikely that our results are driven by the selection
which causes better able students to go to schools
whose principals consider prior performance in
accepting the students to the school.
Some countries have national policies regarding
tracking (e.g. Germany, the Netherlands), while
others let schools decide whether and how to imple-
ment informal tracking (e.g. United States, Sweden).
The manner in which students are placed into tracks
also differs widely across countries. For instance, in
the Netherlands, elementary school students all take
an obligatory exit test and combined with the obli-
gatory recommendation of the elementary school
teacher on the most suited track, the secondary
school accepts students to specific tracks mainly
based on that test and that recommendation. In
Germany, however, in most northern states, parents
have the right to persuade schools to accept their
child into the highest tracks, while there is no exit
test and the teacher’s recommendation is only
optional (Dollmann 2011). Higher educated parents
are often more willing to ensure their child goes to
the higher track, which introduces an advantage for
their children. Of these two countries, only the
Netherlands places students into tracks based on
performance (a proxy of ability combining ability
with motivation), while it is to be expected that in
Germany a strong effect of PB on track placement,
and consequently on student performance, is to be
found and this is indeed the case (Dustmann 2004).
These two examples show that in the relation of
tracking and student performance or educational
opportunities, the method of selecting students into
tracks could influence outcomes.
To take into account that school principals that
consider prior performance possibly do so to be able
to accept only the best students to their school, we
compare the results of different models which look
at between-school between-countries variation,
between-school variation and between-countries
variation.1 In the first model, we control for the
best available internationally comparable track level
of the individual students. In the second model, we
use only the between-schools variation by using
country fixed effects, which alleviates possible coun-
try heterogeneity, for instance but not exclusively, on
track placement policies. And third, by using the
national percentage of schools which consider prior
performance, we look at between-countries variation
only to try to eliminate the bias due to selective
student acceptance. That tracking has a positive
effect on student performance when the method of
track placement is taken into account is seen in all
three the models. The coefficients are the smallest in
the within country model, while they are the largest,
although insignificant, in the between-countries
model. If the relation was purely driven by a selec-
tion bias created by school principals, this would not
be expected since then most of the variation would
be between schools in a given country.
The findings indicate that it is important to con-
sider how school principals select students into
tracks when looking at the effects of tracking on
performance or educational opportunities; or more
general, that school characteristics need to be taken
into account when analysing education systems.
Perhaps this insight can also explain why the litera-
ture finds mixed effects of tracking on both student
performance and educational opportunities.
The structure of this article is as follows: Section
II discusses theoretical insights in tracking and how
schools can affect tracking. Section III describes the
data used in the analysis, while Section IV lays out
the empirical strategy. Section V presents the results.
Finally, the last section concludes the article.
II. Tracking
Tracking is widely used in secondary school systems
around the world. The most important differences
between countries in the implementation of tracking
are on the number of tracks available to 15 year old
students (most frequently ranging from two to five)
and on the age of selection into tracks (from 10 to
16). In the countries that have tracking, tracks are
1Another reason why schools that consider prior performance might not use this for track placement is that the entry of students into the secondary school
might not coincide with the start of tracking. However, in most countries the start of secondary and tracking coincide. Only 7 of the 21 tracking countries
do not start tracking at the start of secondary school. Russia’s secondary school starts at age 10, but tracking starts at 14.5 years. Students in Luxembourg
start secondary school at age 12, but tracking starts at 13. In Lithuania, it is 11 versus 15, in Italy 11 versus 14, in Israel, Ireland and Greece 12 versus 15.
However, even for schools in these 7 countries, the earlier obtained prior performance may aid schools in track placement.
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institutionalized in different school types and often
located in different buildings and administrative
units, while in countries without tracking non-insti-
tutionalized tracking can occur within schools, either
by ability grouping (different classes within schools)
or seating (different curricula within classes).2
Tracking is a form of imposing peer homogeneity
on students, while it also offers students a more
targeted curriculum. Each track is aimed to consist
of a more or less homogeneous student population,
depending on the number of tracks available.
However, the effect of imposing peer homogeneity
is not theoretically straightforward. First, by remov-
ing the better-performing students from the lower
tracks, the mean performance of the lower tracks
decreases and the resulting lower level of peer per-
formance can harm the performance of the lower
ability students. In contrast, the performance of the
high-ability students, who are now surrounded by
more high-ability peers, improves with positive spil-
lovers. If peer effects work through mean perfor-
mance, as described above, we would expect to find
no country effect of tracking since the positive and
negative peer effects on performance cancel each
other out. On the other hand, when peer effects are
non-linear, tracking can have nationwide effects.
The theoretical models of non-linear peer effects
support either positive or negative effects of tracking
(see Sacerdote 2011). For instance, when especially
high-ability students benefit from high-ability peers,
tracking has a positive overall effect; when especially
low-ability students benefit from high-ability peers,
tracking has a negative effect.
Second, peer homogeneity in tracks can be good
for both high- and low-ability students when tea-
chers target their teaching to the average perfor-
mance of the class. In highly differentiated systems
(i.e. systems with a large number of tracks), the top
and bottom pupils are closer to the average perfor-
mance level in the class and can thus benefit from
peer homogeneity when it allows them to learn more
from the teacher.
In addition to imposing peer homogeneity on
students, tracking exposes students to specialized
curricula, which means that students in different
tracks are taught at different levels of difficulty. As
long as the specialized curricula are optimally
designed for the average characteristics of the stu-
dents in the track, they should increase performance.
Overall, we would expect a positive effect of track-
ing due to improved teaching strategies and adjusted
curricula, while the effect of tracking due to more
homogeneous peer groups is theoretically uncertain.
However, peer effects in the classroom are found to
be very context specific, and, if they exist, the size of
peer effects is modest (Sacerdote 2014) and thus we
disregard them from our expectations. In sum, we
therefore expect a positive effect of tracking due to
more homogeneous classes. Disentangling the differ-
ent effects from peers, adjusted curricula and
adjusted teacher strategies is not possible in our
setup. We will therefore look at all three effects
combined.
The arguments in the paragraphs above assume
that track placement is based on ability, for instance
proxied by prior performance. However, as already
mentioned, track placement is not always based on
performance. Dustmann (2004) shows for Germany
that PB is a strong predictor of track choice and that
there is strong intergenerational immobility in track
choice. When parents are free to send their child to
any of the available tracks, they may choose the track
they attended and/or the track they are familiar with.
Schools could also select students based on artistic
performance or on other aspects as religion or resi-
dential area. When this happens, tracks are no
longer homogeneous in performance.
We expect that schools that use an objective mea-
sure to place students into tracks have greater per-
formance homogeneity in tracks and this induces the
expected positive effects of tracking as described
above. Schools selecting students into tracks without
an awareness of their observed abilities or basing
their selection on non-academic criteria can severely
limit the expected positive effects of tracking.
Schools that have information on prior performance
when they place students into tracks, may be better
able to ensure homogeneous classes than schools
that do not have the same.
We also expect that when schools use a perfor-
mance measure to select students into track, the
influence of parents is lower. Naturally, we do not
2In countries with non-institutionalized forms of tracking, placement in the higher performing group can also affect student performance and the effect of
PB on performance. However, this non-institutionalized tracking lies outside the scope of this article.
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assume that when schools consider prior perfor-
mance, parents have no influence on school choice
or performance. Parents always influence a child’s
ability, directly through genes and/or indirectly
through the environment they create for their chil-
dren. However, we assume that as long as observed
ability limit non-ability-related parental influence on
track choice, the effect of PB is decreased.
III. Data
The student- and school-level data used in this arti-
cle are from the 2009 wave of the PISA, executed by
the OECD. These data include internationally com-
parable test scores in reading, mathematics and
science and information on students and schools.
The country-level data are from the OECD and
The World Bank.
The first wave of PISA was presented in 2000 and,
since then, every 3 years a representative sample of
students from all participating countries is subjected
to tests on reading, mathematics and science. The
test results are standardized to a mean of 500 and a
standard deviation of 100 on the PISA reading test in
2000 for the OECD countries.3 In addition to the
tests, the students and school principals are sur-
veyed. A total of 75 countries participated in PISA
2009. Since these countries are diverse in their eco-
nomic development, we use a selection of compar-
able Western countries to limit country
heterogeneity. All 31 countries in this analysis have
a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita above
the minimum of the OECD and available data on
national tracking policies.4 These limitations on the
sample are imposed to ensure that no country dif-
ferences drive the results, although also country
fixed effects models are used to further take country
difference into account.
A representative sample from each participating
country is obtained by the OECD in two stages:
First, schools are selected and, then, students of the
target age are selected within these schools. The
target age is set to a range of 15 years and 3 months
to 16 years and 2 months (OECD 2010). Since not all
selected schools and students were willing to parti-
cipate and some schools and students were over-
sampled to obtain extra information on these
groups, the OECD provides weights to ensure sam-
ple representation. The student sample in this ana-
lysis consists of all native students in (pre-)
vocational or general education who were in schools
where more than five students participated in PISA
2009.5 This amounts to 187 768 students in 7489
schools in 31 countries.
Tracking and selection by schools
We define tracking as the separation of students into
tracks that differ in academic orientation and curri-
cula. The extent of tracking is measured using the
‘number of school types or distinct educational pro-
grammes available to 15-year-olds’ (OECD,
Table 5.2, 2007), as shown in the first column of
Table 1. This measure of tracking is different from
those used in some other papers. For instance, Fuchs
and Woessmann (2007) and Elk, van Der Steeg, and
Webbink (2011) use the age at which a student is
first selected into a track as a measure of tracking,
while Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) and
Schuetz, Ursprung, and Woessmann (2008) divide
countries into early versus late trackers. However,
this measure of tracking is more consistent with our
theoretical expectations from Section II. As dis-
cussed in Section II, we expect that the greatest effect
from tracking will come from this imposed homo-
geneity. A disadvantage of using the number of
tracks as our tracking measure, however, is that it
does not take into account the amount of time
students spend in the tracks. Section VI addresses
this issue.
Besides a measure on class homogeneity due to
tracking (the number of tracks), our framework in
3The OECD provides five plausible values estimated using item response theory for the test scores since students do not receive all questions. Here only one
plausible value is used.
4Countries that are excluded are Australia, Canada, France, Mexico and the United Kingdom. We have excluded France since we have no data on schools,
included the needed school data on whether principals consider prior performance. We excluded Turkey since we have no information on the language
spoken at home which is an important individual-level background characteristic. The United Kingdom and Australia we excluded since for a large number
of observations we do not have data on the proxy for the track the student is in. Canada is excluded since all students are coded as neither vocational nor
general education. Mexico is excluded since the values on many variables are outliers: The mean and/or maximum values of the parental background
variable and a number of school variables are at least more than half a standard deviation from the mean and/or maximum values of the other countries.
5We include only native students since the literature shows that native and migrant students respond differently to system characteristics (e.g. Dronkers, Van
Der Velden, and Dunne 2012).
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Section II requires a school-level variable depicting
the selection mechanism with which students are
selected into tracks. PISA 2009 contains a proxy for
such a variable, namely an index based on a PISA
2009 question to school principals on how often
consideration was given to a student’s record of
academic performance (including placements tests)
and to feeder school recommendations in admitting
the student to the school. Schools are divided into
three categories: (1) schools where neither of the two
factors is considered, (2) schools where at least one
of these factors is sometimes used to decide accep-
tance and (3) schools where at least one of the two
factors is always considered. In this article, whether
schools consider prior performance on acceptance to
the school is used synonymous to whether schools
have performance criteria for track placement of
students. This assumes that secondary schools that
have prior performance information use this to
decide on the track placement of students.
Table 1 gives an overview of the percentage of
schools per country that consider prior performance.
Countries differ substantially on the percentage of
schools that consider prior performance, from 79.6%
of students in schools in Spain that never consider
them to 93.5% that always consider them in Croatia.
The type of school that considers prior performance
also differs across countries: for instance, in the
Czech Republic and Hungary, schools that do are
often upper secondary schools, while in Austria and
Poland, it are mostly schools where students with a
high PB attend. In general, village schools or schools
without neighbouring schools are less likely to con-
sider prior performance; schools that service more
girls, vocational students or students in upper sec-
ondary school, higher PB schools and schools which
have more teacher shortages are more likely to con-
sider prior performance.
As can be seen from Table 1, in almost every
country there are schools in all three categories,
Table 1. Tracking and selection by schools.
No. of school tracks
available to 15-year-olds
Percentage of students in schools that consider prior performance for student acceptance
Country Never Sometimes Always
Argentina 3 47.4 31.3 21.3
Austria 4 21.3 18.2 60.5
Belgium 4 38.3 45.1 16.6
Chile 2 17.4 43.1 39.5
Croatia 3 0.0 6.5 93.5
Czech Republic 5 23.7 27.0 49.3
Denmark 1 50.6 44.6 4.8
Estonia 1 13.5 56.6 30.0
Finland 1 69.2 27.0 3.8
Germany 4 10.3 15.7 74.1
Greece 2 55.0 38.8 6.2
Hungary 3 5.4 4.8 89.8
Iceland 1 69.8 27.4 2.8
Ireland 4 43.7 36.8 19.6
Israel 2 11.1 35.1 53.8
Italy 3 28.6 30.1 41.3
Latvia 3 44.6 30.4 25.0
Lithuania 3 38.9 48.1 13.0
Luxembourg 4 0.5 57.5 42.0
Netherlands 4 0.6 11.7 87.7
New Zealand 1 35.3 39.6 25.2
Norway 1 75.8 18.3 5.8
Poland 1 34.9 49.0 16.1
Portugal 3 71.1 27.7 1.2
Russian Federation 3 36.3 40.8 22.9
Slovak Republic 5 18.3 18.7 63.1
Slovenia 3 23.0 46.6 30.4
Spain 1 79.6 18.0 2.5
Sweden 1 78.6 18.4 3.1
Switzerland 4 22.6 13.1 64.3
United States 1 45.8 26.4 27.8
One track 1 (61 535 students) 55.3 (37 794) 32.5 (17 731) 12.2 (6010)
Two tracks 2 (14 336 students) 27.8 (3748) 39.0 (5634) 33.2 (4954)
Three tracks 3 (66 376 students) 32.8 (21 322) 29.6 (19 943) 37.6 (25 111)
Four tracks 4 (35 217 students) 19.6 (8326) 28.3 (9184) 52.1 (17 707)
Five tracks 5 (10 304 students) 21.0 (1902) 22.8 (2375) 56.2 (6027)
Source: OECD (2007) (first column) and PISA 2009 (second till fourth column). Whether schools consider prior performance is obtained from a questionnaire
filled out by the school principal (see text for more details).
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that is, schools that never, sometimes and always
consider prior performance. Thus, even in systems
with a high number of tracks, some schools do not
use prior academic performance or teacher recom-
mendations to decide school admittance. In the
seven countries with four tracks, only 55% of the
students go to schools that always consider prior
performance; in the two countries with five tracks,
18% of students go to schools that never consider
prior performance. Maybe more surprising, even in
a comprehensive system, some schools consider
prior performance when accepting students: In the
10 countries with only one track, 45% of students
went to schools that consider prior academic perfor-
mance. A reason could be that also in countries
without tracking, non-institutionalized forms of
tracking (ability grouping or seating) exist, which
could induce schools to select students based on
prior performance. The mechanisms in those coun-
tries could work in similar ways as described here.
For instance, Lucas (1999) has shown that various
methods of placement in non-institutionalized tracks
in schools in the US can produce variation in the
strength of the effect of prior performance and PB
on student performance.
Control variables
The control variables used represent a standard set
of variables used in the literature. All student vari-
ables are collected through student surveys. This
study controls for gender, age, PB,6 a dummy for
(pre-) vocational education as opposed to general
education and a dummy for upper secondary school
as opposed to lower secondary education. PB is
captured by a widely used index composed by the
OECD that describes the student’s economic, social
and cultural status. The division between upper and
lower secondary schools is based on the
International Standard Classification of Education
level, which provides internationally comparable
standards for comparing education levels.
The school-level variables are collected through a
survey completed by the school principals. School
composition is captured by the school average and
standard deviation of the PB of all the students per
school, and by the percentage of them who speak a
language other than the test language at home.7
School inputs are captured by the student–teacher
ratio, an index of possible teacher shortages, dummy
variables indicating whether the school is hindered
by a shortage in instruction material and an index
indicating whether the school is responsible for the
curriculum and assessment. Other school character-
istics, all obtained from the school principal survey,
indicate whether school achievement is tracked by
an educational authority; whether the school is a
public, private government-dependent, or private
government-independent school; whether the school
has to compete with none, one, or two or more
schools for students; the school location; school
size; and whether the school uses ability grouping.
We also control for the GDP per capita PPP (con-
stant 2005 international dollars), which is for 2008
from the World Bank (2012). Table 2 provides
descriptive statistics for all variables.
IV. Empirical strategy
The aim of this article is to investigate whether using
performance to select students into tracks changes
the relation between tracking and student perfor-
mance and educational opportunities. To answer
this question we make use of three models: a
between-schools between-countries model depicted
in Equation (1), a within-country model depicted in
Equation (2) and a between-countries model
depicted in Equation (3).
Testisc ¼ β0 þ Studentiscβ1 þ Schoolscβ2
þ EntrReqscβ3 þ No: of Trackscβ4
þ EntrReqsc  No: of Tracks0cβ5
þ GDPpccβ6 þ uc þ usc þ isc (1)
Testisc ¼ δ0 þ Studentiscδ1 þ Schoolscδ2
þ EntrReqscδ3 þ Ccδ4 þ EntrReqsc
 No: of Tracks0cδ5 þ wsc þ #isc (2)
6PB is an important control variable since it is very well established that parents have a large influence on student performance. Among our 31 countries, the
correlation between PB and the reading score is between 0.23 and 0.49, with the lowest score in Iceland and the highest in Hungary. Countries without
tracking at age 15 have a correlation of 0.30, while countries with tracking have a correlation of 0.37.
7To calculate the school PB composition, both native and immigrant students are used.
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Testisc ¼ θ0 þ Studentiscθ1 þ Schoolscθ2
þ Nat%EntrReqcθ3
þ No: of Trackscθ4
þ Nat% EntrReqc
 No: of Tracks0cθ5 þ GDPpccθ6
þ zc þ zsc þ μisc (3)
In these equations, Testisc is the individual PISA
test score in reading, mathematics or science of stu-
dent i in school s in country c. Studentisc is a matrix of
student variables, Schoolsc is a matrix of school vari-
ables, while EntrReqsc is a matrix containing the
dummies on whether schools consider prior perfor-
mance. No: of Tracksc is a vector containing the
number of tracks available to students in each coun-
try. GDPpcc is a vector containing GDP per capita.
Our main coefficients or interest of Equation (1) are
β3, β4 and β5 which capture the effect of the number
of tracks combined with whether the school principal
considered prior performance.8 As compared to the
main model in Equation (1), model (2) adds country
fixed effects, Cc, while in model (3) we use the
national percentage of school whose principals some-
times or always consider prior performance on
accepting the student to the school, Nat% EntrReqc,
as opposed to the school-level variable. We use ran-
dom effect models, which are estimated using max-
imum likelihood, to take into account error terms for
countries, schools and individuals: Separate error
terms are therefore included for countries, schools
and individuals, since students are nested within
schools within countries. Weighting is used to ensure
representative samples.9 The control variables are like
discussed in Section IV.
The reason we analyse three models is that we are
concerned with multiple selection issues. First, we add
to our standard model (Equation (1)) also a country
fixed effects model (Equation (2)) to exclude the pos-
sibility of country heterogeneity biasing the results. By
using a country fixed effect model, we only compare
outcomes of students in schools in which the princi-
pals does or does not consider prior performance,
given the country and given the number of tracks
which are available in that country. The interaction
between the number of tracks and whether principals
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum Type % missing
PISA reading score 493.11 93.52 1.97 817.42 cont 0.00
PISA mathematics score 495.33 94.61 42.85 901.86 cont 0.00
PISA science score 502.88 94.98 10.95 863.24 cont 0.00
Parental background 0.07 0.94 −5.34 3.41 cont 0.38
Gender 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 dum 0.00
Age 15.77 0.29 15.25 16.33 cont 0.00
Student in (pre-) vocational education 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 dum 0.01
Student in upper secondary school 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 dum 0.01
Mean school PB 0.04 0.56 −2.55 1.61 cont 0.00
SD of school PB 0.77 0.16 0.17 1.58 cont 0.00
Percentage in class for whom the first language is not the test language 4.90 1.25 1.00 6.00 cat 2.70
Student–teacher ratio 12.72 6.45 0.39 264.33 cont 8.24
Teacher shortage −0.14 0.88 −1.02 3.34 cont 2.08
Hinder by a shortage instruct material 1.82 0.83 1.00 4.00 cat 2.30
School responsible for curriculum and assessment −0.14 0.94 −1.37 1.36 cont 1.56
Index of achievement tracked by authority 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 dum 3.36
School type 1.18 0.44 1.00 3.00 cat 3.57
School competition 1.67 0.85 1.00 3.00 cat 2.07
School location 2.88 1.09 1.00 5.00 cat 1.60
School size 659.48 491.29 10.00 6850.00 cont 3.27
Ability grouping 1.78 0.67 1.00 3.00 cat 0.36
School considers prior performance 1.98 0.83 1.00 3.00 cat 2.77
No. of tracks 1.61 1.31 0.00 4.00 cont 0.00
GDP per capita, 2008 $28 856.03 $12 410.14 $13 275.68 $73 349.64 cont 0.00
Source: PISA (2009), OECD (2007: Number of tracks available to 15-year old students) and World Bank (2012: GDP per capita 2008).
Variables can be continuous (cont), dummy variables (dum) or categorical variables (cat). The mean and standard deviation of the school PB is constructed
from the imputed PB data. The table presents data that are not demeaned.
8Not all students are tracked at the same time: the age of selection runs from age 10 to age 15. Therefore, the effect of the number of tracks and whether
school principals considered prior performance on students’ performance may have occurred at the time when the PISA tests were administered (age
15–16), but it could also have occurred earlier in time and we only capture it at age 15 when the students do the test.
9The weights are adjusted such that each country has an equal weight in the estimation. All statistics and estimations are executed using weights, unless
otherwise specified.
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consider prior performance gives us the estimates we
are interested in. The main tracking effect, which
drops out, will be captured in the country fixed effects.
Second, we use also between-country analyses
(Equation (3)) to exclude the alternative explanation
of why school principals would consider prior perfor-
mance, namely to select the best students and thus the
best performances for their school (‘cherry picking’).
Even given our alternative models, it could still be
that all countries with a lot of tracks and which have
schools that select students are different from all
countries that do not. Our country-fixed effects
models would not be able to control for this.
Furthermore, although we control for a large num-
ber of school characteristics and also check for sort-
ing into schools using our between-country analyses,
unobservables which are related to student perfor-
mance, tracking and whether schools select students
based on performance and which would cancel out
on the country level could potentially exist.
To study the hypotheses on student performance,
the main focus lies on the interaction between track-
ing and whether schools consider prior performance,
EntrReqsc  no: of Tracks0c. Our hypothesis is that
this interaction will be positive: School principals
that consider prior performance in selecting students
into tracks are more likely to achieve positive track-
ing effects due to more homogenous classes.
To look at whether the effect of PB is lower when
track placement is done based on prior performance
we use Equations (4) and (5). Equation (4) contains
an interaction between PB and the number of tracks
in a country, and will show whether in countries with
more tracks there is a larger effect of PB. Equation (5)
then adds the interaction between number of tracks,
PB and whether school principals consider prior per-
formance. This triple interaction will show whether
the effect of PB is lowered when track placement is
done based on ability. The PB of students is included
in all models in the vector, Studentisc.
Testisc ¼ γ0 þ Studentiscγ1 þ Schoolscγ2
þ EntrReqscγ3 þ No: of Trackscγ4
þ PBisc  No: of Tracks0cγ5
þ GDPpccγ6 þ vc þ vsc þ εisc (4)
Testisc ¼ ρ0 þ Studentiscρ1 þ Schoolscρ2
þ EntrReqscρ3 þ No: of Trackscρ4
þ PBisc  No: of Tracks0cρ5 þ PBisc
 No: of Tracks0c  EntrReqscρ6
þ GDPpccρ7 þ tc þ tsc þ πisc (5)
Almost all student- and school-level variables
have some missing observations (see last column of
Table 2). Although most variables have below 3%
missing values, deleting all observations with miss-
ing variables would lead to a drop in observations
from around 185 000 to around 130 000, and it
would assume that the missing values are missing
at random, which is a questionable assumption.
Another reason for not deleting all observations is
that it leads to distorted weighting. Therefore, the
missing values in the sample are replaced by group
averages.10 To control for possible bias introduced
by the method for replacing missing values, imputa-
tion dummies and imputation interactions are used
in all models.11
V. Results
First, we replicate the standard cross country analy-
sis of the effect of tracking on student performance.
Then, we turn to investigating whether using perfor-
mance to select students into tracks has an effect on
the relation between tracking and student perfor-
mance. We first present the results on the between-
countries between-schools models, and subsequently
show the between-countries and the within-country
results. And third, we focus on whether using per-
formance to select students into tracks has an effect
on the relation between tracking and educational
opportunities.
Direct relation between tracking and student
performance
The analysis starts by investigating whether the
number of tracks has a direct and significant relation
with student performance. Since we include a wide
variety of school background variables, which may
capture part of the tracking effect, we do not expect
10The student variables are replaced by the average value of the students in the same school, the school variables are replaced by the country average.
Country variables are never missing.
11The results are robust to the exclusion of the imputation variable interaction terms, and imputation dummies.
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a large coefficient for tracking. Table 3 confirms our
expectations: The association between the number of
tracks and performance is insignificant, while it is
negative for reading and positive for mathematics
and science. For all three test subjects, the relation
between schools that sometimes consider prior per-
formance and student performance is negative, while
for schools that always consider prior performance
this relation is positive (and significant).
All the control variables, which are excluded from
the table, have the expected sign. The results of the
full models are available upon request.
Tracking and performance
To test whether considering prior performance to
select students into tracks has an effect on the rela-
tion between tracking and student performance, we
include interactions between whether schools con-
sider prior performance and the number of tracks, as
in Equation (1). The results can be seen in Table 4.
More tracks in an education system are positive for
student’s performance if students attend schools
where the principals consider prior performance on
accepting the student to the school. For reading
there is still a significant negative effect of more
tracks (−5.74**), but this is compensated when
schools always consider prior performance and
there are 4 or 5 tracks to choose from. Since for
mathematics and science no significant negative
coefficient of tracking exists (−0.88 and −2.89),
more tracks are even better for students when they
attend schools which always considers prior
performance.
To facilitate the interpretation of the interaction
terms, Figure 1 shows the combined coefficients for
the three models. Figure 1 shows for each combina-
tion of number of tracks and whether schools con-
sider prior performance what the relation between
the two and student performance is, relative to stu-
dents in a system with only one track in schools that
never consider prior performance. Looking at the
figures, one sees the same trend for all three subjects
(reading, mathematics and science): schools in mul-
tiple track systems do better when they consider
prior performance more often, while schools in com-
prehensive systems perform better when they do not
consider prior performance. When only the signifi-
cant differences in the graphs are considered, it
becomes clear that for two or more tracks whether
schools consider prior performance only changes the
results when schools always consider prior perfor-
mance. The coefficients for Never and Sometimes
are not significantly different from each other when
the number of tracks is two or more.12
The models in Table 4 use the number of tracks in
a country as a continuous variable ranging from zero
to four. Appendix A found in the online
Supplemental material contains non-linear models
which include the number of tracks in a country as
dummy variables. The results are qualitatively similar.
From Table 4 it can be concluded that students in a
system with a high number of tracks do better when
their school always considers prior performance,
while for students in a system with a low number of
Table 3. The effect of tracking on performance.
Dependent variable (1) Reading (2) Mathematics (3) Science
School considers prior performance
Sometimes −2.02 (1.95) −1.37 (1.89) −1.13 (2.06)
Always 6.34* (3.27) 5.51* (3.07) 7.45** (3.79)
No. of tracks (0–4) −2.56 (2.55) 1.94 (3.67) 0.75 (3.30)
(Pseudo-)LL −43 761 −43 739 −44 094
No. of students 187 768 187 768 187 768
No. of countries 31 31 31
The table presents coefficients from random effects models (standard
errors in parenthesis) on the relation between student performance and
the number of tracks in a country, controlling for whether or not schools
consider prior performance when selecting students. The superscripts
* and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
The control variables are as described in the text. The models include
imputation dummies and imputation variable interaction terms.
Table 4. The effect of tracking on performance and the influ-
ence of selection on performance.
Dependent variable (1) Reading
(2)
Mathematics (3) Science
School considers prior performance
Sometimes −5.97** (2.54) −4.95** (2.40) −5.99** (2.44)
Always −10.13** (4.11) −9.54** (4.25) −10.90** (5.06)
No. of tracks (0–4) −5.74** (2.70) −0.88 (3.75) −2.89 (3.31)
Sometimes × No. of
tracks
2.83** (1.15) 2.50** (1.16) 3.45*** (1.08)
Always × No. of tracks 8.64*** (1.82) 7.85*** (1.90) 9.68*** (2.04)
(Pseudo)LL −43 759 −43 738 −44 092
No. of students 187 768 187 768 187 768
No. of countries 31 31 31
The table presents coefficients from random effects models (standard
errors in parenthesis) on the relation between student performance and
whether or not schools consider prior performance when selecting stu-
dents and the number of tracks in a country. The superscripts ** and ***
indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The control
variables are as described in the text. The models include imputation
dummies and imputation variable interaction terms.
12Except for science, where the combined coefficients for the Never and Sometimes are significantly different in a system with five tracks.
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tracks (two or three) whether schools consider prior
performance do not seem to matter. In a system with
four or five tracks, the schools that consider prior
performance can place students into the available
tracks based on this information, and thus in these
schools class homogeneity is higher as compared to
schools that do not obtain information on prior per-
formance of their students. The data suggest that to
place students into only two or three tracks is not
beneficial for student performance regardless of
whether schools consider prior performance. A
possible explanation for this is that two or three tracks
do not allow for enough differentiation between stu-
dents with heterogeneous ability. In a system with one
track whether schools consider prior performance still
matters for student performance: Although students
in schools that sometimes or always consider prior
performance do not perform differently from each
other, schools that never consider prior performance
perform (marginally) better.
The results presented above will be biased if the


































































Figure 1. Differences in student performance for students in different education systems that attend schools that do or do not
consider prior performance, relative to students in a comprehensive system in schools that never consider prior performance. (a)
Reading, (b) Mathematics and (c) Science.
Source: Own calculations using PISA (2009).
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into schools. This may be the case when schools that
consider prior performance on accepting students do
so to be able to select the most able students and not
to allocate students into tracks. Under the assump-
tion of full sorting into schools, it is to be expected
that schools that consider prior performance will
have students that always perform better. However,
this is not the case: In systems with only one track,
whether schools consider prior performance does
not seem to matter much (it is only marginally better
to be in a school that does not consider prior per-
formance than to be in one which does) and in a
system with only a few tracks (2 or 3), whether
schools consider prior performance do not seem to
matter at all. Therefore, schools which consider prior
performance when deciding on accepting the stu-
dent to the school do not perform better by
definition.
That the hypotheses following full sorting do not
seem to be confirmed by the data does not mean
sorting is not a problem in these analyses. Sorting in
lesser extent can still exist and could potentially bias
the results. To investigate this, we present results
using only between-countries variation, as shown
for mathematics in Table 5. Appendix B found in
the online Supplemental material shows the same
comparison for reading and science. The first col-
umn of Table 5 replicates column (2) from Table 4
for comparative purposes. The third column of
Table 5 replaces the school-level dummies on
whether schools consider prior performance by vari-
ables depicting the national proportion of students
in schools that sometimes or always consider prior
performance. This model excludes the possible sort-
ing of students into schools since this micro-phe-
nomenon cannot intervene with the estimation
when whether schools consider prior performance
is measured at the country level. Schools that always
consider prior performance have a negative impact
on student performance (−134.23***); however, this
is compensated in countries with more than 3 tracks
due to the positive interaction term with the number
of tracks (49.89***).13 For an average country, where
29% of students are in schools that sometimes con-
sider prior performance and where 32% are in
schools that always consider prior performance, per-
formance for reading is best if there is one track and
performance for mathematics and science is best if
there are five tracks. For a country with a high
percentage of schools that always consider prior
performance, students perform best in a five-track
system, regardless of the subject.14 For countries
with high numbers of schools that never or some-
times consider prior performance, students perform
best with two tracks, also regardless of the subject.15
There results seem to indicate that, although sorting
into schools could be a problem, it is unlikely that it
alone drives our results.
We are also concerned that country heterogeneity
could influence our results. For that reason Table 5
also contains a country fixed effects model using
mathematics as dependent variable. The second
Table 5. Comparing different models on student performance








School considers prior performance
Sometimes −4.95** (2.40) −3.82* (2.03) 99.29*
(54.46)
Always −9.54** (4.25) −2.03 (3.99) −134.23***
(40.72)
No. of tracks (0–4) −0.88 (3.75) – 9.60 (17.72)
Sometimes × No.
of tracks
2.50** (1.16) 2.28** (1.01) −58.77
(37.00)
Always × No. of
tracks
7.85*** (1.90) 5.11** (2.01) 49.89**
(22.7)
Country FE – √ –
(Pseudo)LL −43 738 −43 695 −43 733
No. of students 187 768 187 768 187 768
No. of countries 31 31 31
The table presents coefficients from random effects models (standard
errors in parenthesis) on the relation between student performance and
whether or not schools consider prior performance when selecting stu-
dents and the number of tracks in a country using three specifications.
Column (1) shows the main model as depicted in column (2) of Table 4.
Column (2) shows the same models but with country fixed effects
included. Column (3) measures the school variables ‘school principal
consider prior performance’ on a national level, and thus depicts the
proportion of schools (between 0 and 1) in the country with school which
say they always or sometimes consider prior performance. The super-
scripts *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively. The control variables are as described in the text. The
models include imputation dummies and imputation variable interaction
terms.
13The variables and their interactions do not show significant results for reading and science, partly due to the reduction in the number of degrees of
freedom. However, an F-test is performed to see whether the main and interaction effects are jointly significant. They are for mathematics and reading. For
science the five variables are not jointly significant, but the three variables relating to schools that always consider prior performance are jointly significant
at the 5% level.
14In this case, 58% in schools that always consider prior performance (the mean plus one standard deviation).
15In this case, 42% of students attend schools that sometimes consider prior performance (the mean plus one standard deviation) and 6% attend schools
that always consider prior performance (the mean minus one standard deviation).
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column of Table 5 shows the same model but now
including country fixed effects to check whether
country heterogeneity influences the results. The
interactions are a bit smaller (2.28** versus 2.50**
and 5.11** versus 7.85**), but qualitatively similar.
For all subjects, students perform best in systems
with a high number of tracks when schools always
consider prior performance. As also pointed out by
Schuetz, Ursprung, and Woessmann (2008), a model
with country fixed effects provides unbiased results
for cross-country analysis, assuming that the existing
country heterogeneity does not influence the inter-
action between whether schools consider prior per-
formance and the number of tracks. Although this
model still does not allow for a strict causal inter-
pretation, the assumption required is considerably
weaker than the assumption that no unobserved
country heterogeneity exists, even with a sample of
similar countries.
Tracking and inequality
The results for whether using performance to select
students into tracks has an effect on the relation
between tracking and educational opportunities are
displayed in Table 6. As expected and consistent with
the literature, PB has a positive and substantial rela-
tion with test scores. This effect is similar over the
three PISA test subjects, reading, mathematics and
science, and comprises about a quarter of a standard
deviation in the test scores. If we look at the interac-
tion between PB and tracking in columns (1)–(3), it
can be seen that tracking mitigates the association
with PB, and therefore reduces inequality of opportu-
nity: The interaction of the number of tracks and PB
is negative and highly significant. The first three
columns show that in a system with five tracks the
association of PB is lowered by 17.3 points in reading,
16.2 in mathematics and 18.2 in science.
Finding that tracking reduces inequality is not
fully consistent with the literature, which most
often finds that tracking increases inequality or has
no effect. To further investigate the drivers of this
positive effect of tracking, we show in columns (4)–
(6) in Table 6 the results of the same models, but
now including also interactions between PB, the
number of tracks and whether schools consider
prior performance on deciding to accept the student
to the school. This allows us to check if for schools
that consider prior performance, and are assumed to
use this information for track placement, the effect
of PB is lower. The last three columns show that the
interaction between the number of tracks and PB is
no longer significant; however, the triple interactions
(number of tracks, PB and whether schools consider
prior performance) are. The table indicates that it is
primarily the schools that always consider prior per-
formance in systems with multiple tracks that miti-
gate the relation of PB with performance. Thus it is
not tracking itself that diminishes the association of
PB and performance but, rather, tracking combined
with whether schools consider prior performance.
This is consistent with our expectation that when
schools consider prior performance, parents have
less influence on their child’s track choice and sub-
sequent performance.
VI. Robustness
In this section, we consider other possible distorting
factors for our analyses: heterogeneous effects for PB
groups, the measure of tracking used and the sample
Table 6. The effect of tracking on inequality and the influence of selection on performance.
Dependent variable (1) Reading (2) Math (3) Science (4) Reading (5) Math (6) Science
Parental background 23.68*** (1.86) 24.45*** (2.06) 24.76*** (2.02) 23.44*** (1.91) 24.26*** (2.10) 24.53*** (2.07)
School considers prior performance
Sometimes −1.91 (1.94) −1.35 (1.89) −1.09 (2.05) −2.51 (2.01) −1.98 (2.01) −1.75 (2.06)
Always 6.72* (3.39) 5.7* (3.07) 7.75* (3.74) 5.91* (3.35) 4.96 (3.11) 6.90* (3.71)
No. of tracks (0–4) −2.50 (2.62) 2.03 (3.73) 0.84 (3.38) −2.27 (2.59) 2.23 (3.71) 1.06 (3.37)
Parental background × No. of tracks −3.45*** (0.99) −3.23*** (1.11) −3.64*** (1.09) −1.93 (1.21) −1.80 (1.25) −2.05* (1.22)
Parental background × No. of tracks × Sometimes −0.90** (0.37) −1.13** (0.55) −1.13** (0.52)
Parental background × No. of tracks × Always −2.49*** (0.72) −2.18*** (0.72) −2.50*** (0.67)
(Pseudo-)LL −43 752 −43 731 −44 085 −43 750 −43 730 −44 083
No. of students 187 768 187 768 187 768 187 768 187 768 187 768
No. of countries 31 31 31 31 31 31
The table presents coefficients from random effects models (standard errors in parenthesis) on the relation between student performance and parental
background, whether or not schools consider prior performance when selecting students and the number of tracks in a country. The superscripts *, ** and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The control variables are as described in the text. The models include imputation
dummies and imputation variable interaction terms.
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of countries. We report all robustness checks with
the PISA mathematics score, unless otherwise stated
the results for reading and science are robust to the
various checks.16 The results which are not shown
are available on request.
Sample split on PB
Table 6 indicates that the differences between stu-
dents of low and high PB are minimized in a highly
differentiated system. To investigate whether the
effects of tracking and whether schools consider
prior performance on accepting students on equality
of opportunity are indeed different for students of
different socio-economic background, we estimate
models for the subsamples of low and high socio-
economic background students. Table 7 shows the
results. For students with high PB (column (2)) the
relation between tracks and performance is negative,
irrespective of whether schools consider prior per-
formance. However, for low PB students (column
(1)) the number of tracks does not alter educational
opportunities. However, the triple interactions (PB,
number of tracks and whether schools consider prior
performance) show that when schools always con-
sider prior performance, a high number of tracks are
beneficial for low PB students since their
disadvantaged background has less of an effect on
their performance.
Timing of tracking
Unlike some other papers on this topic, we use the
number of tracks available to students at the age of
15 to characterize a country’s tracking regime. Since
the PISA test is conducted when the students are
between 15 and 16, it is possible that although multi-
ple tracks are available to students at the age of 15,
students have not yet been tracked for a substantial
amount of time. If this is the case, the association
with tracking in late selection countries may be too
weak to be picked up. To check for this, we redo the
analysis including interactions between whether a
country selects early, the number of tracks, and
whether school principals consider prior perfor-
mance. Table 8 shows the results for the mathe-
matics score as dependent variable, using three
definitions of early tracking: tracking before the age
of 13, before 14 or before 15. Table 8 shows that only
for the students in early tracking countries our
results hold since only the triple interaction early
tracking, the number of tracks and prior perfor-
mance is always considered as significant. However,
if we use the reading- or science score, then also the
interaction for number of tracks and prior perfor-
mance is always considered is significant (not
shown). Our results seem, therefore, to be strongest
for countries that track early, but are not absent for
countries that track later.
Excluding countries without tracking
Even though we estimate country fixed effects mod-
els alongside our main models in Table 4, there
could still be concern about difference among coun-
tries with different tracking regimes which could
affect the relation between tracking and student per-
formance, and the relation between PB, tracking and
student performance. What could especially be of
interest is whether countries that do not track at all
are very different from the countries that do track.
Therefore, we have also estimated our models with-
out the countries that do not track their students.
Table 7. Robustness checks: Sample split on PB (mathematics
score as the dependent variable).
(1) (2)
Model: Low PB High PB
School considers prior performance
Sometimes −2.86 (2.12) −0.70 (1.76)
Always 3.65 (3.16) 7.64** (3.37)
No. of tracks (0–4) 2.84 (4.09) 4.04 (3.72)
Parental background × No. of tracks −0.50 (1.78) −3.08** (1.31)
Parental background × No. of
tracks × Sometimes
−1.17 (0.74) −0.36 (1.13)
Parental background × No. of
tracks × Always
−2.54** (1.19) −0.86 (0.93)
(Pseudo) LL −43 311 −43 918
No. of students 95 406 92 362
No. of countries 31 31
The table presents coefficients from random effects models (standard
errors in parenthesis). Column (1) and (2) replicate column (5) of
Table 6 but column (1) uses only low PB students, while column (2)
uses only high-PB students. The superscript ** indicates significance at
the 5% level. The control variables are as described in the text. The
models include imputation dummies and imputation variable interaction
terms.
16Most of the changes are for students in schools that always considers prior performance. The main result (schools that consider prior performance for
student acceptance mitigates the relation between strong tracking and performance) holds in any specification.
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This leaves us with 21 countries and 126 333 stu-
dents. The results are shown in Table 9. What we
find when we exclude countries which do not track
in Table 9 is that the effect sizes of the coefficients
even larger than in Table 4. Only the coefficients
from the between-countries model (Column (3)) are
very different from before: The coefficients are closer
to zero and far from significant. These results are
very similar over the three test subjects.
For the models on PB where only the interaction
between PB and number of tracks is included,
Column (4), the coefficient is half the size as before
and is no longer significant. But including the triple
interaction, Column (5), the results are very similar
to Table 6. Also the PB results do not seem to be
very different when non-tracking countries are
excluded.
Excluding other countries
Using dummies for the number of tracks as in
Appendix A found in the online Supplemental mate-
rial reveals that especially countries with only a few
tracks perform worse. Looking at the countries with
only a few tracks, the three countries with two tracks
(Israel, Greece and Chile) are among the worst-per-
forming countries with regard to PISA test scores in
reading, mathematics and science. However, exclud-
ing these countries does not influence the results
much (not shown).
Table 8. Robustness checks: Timing of tracking (mathematics
score as dependent variable).
(1) (2) (3)
Early < 13 Early < 14 Early < 15
School considers prior performance
Sometimes −3.60 −4.56** −4.82**
(2.33) (2.31) (2.32)
Always −5.43 −6.65 −8.22**
(3.81) (4.13) (3.85)
No. of tracks (0–4) −1.07 −1.11 −1.06
(3.71) (3.74) (3.74)
Sometimes × No. of tracks −0.20 1.56 2.02
(2.35) (2.05) (2.31)
Sometimes × No. of tracks × Early 3.62 1.36 0.68
(2.20) (2.17) (2.58)
Always × No. of tracks 1.00 2.43 2.50
(2.26) (2.61) (2.49)
Always × No. of tracks × Early 7.41*** 5.74*** 5.62**
(1.94) (2.22) (2.70)
No. of students 187 768 187 768 187 768
No. of early tracking countries 9 11 15
No. of late tracking countries 22 20 16
The table presents coefficients from random effects models (standard
errors in parenthesis) on the relation between student performance and
whether or not schools consider prior performance when selecting stu-
dents and tracking in a country. Column (1) uses as definition for early
tracking country if the students are tracked before the age of 13, Column
(2) uses before the age of 14, while Column (3) uses before the age of 15.
The superscripts ** and *** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels,
respectively. The control variables are as described in the text. The
models include imputation dummies and imputation variable interaction
terms.
Table 9. Robustness checks: Excluding non-tracking countries (mathematics score as dependent variable).











Parental background 14.87*** 14.24*** 14.89*** 11.20*** 9.66**
(1.64) (0.35) (1.64) (4.02) (3.87)
School considers prior performance
Sometimes −8.37 −3.99 −52.19 −0.26 −1.58
(7.01) (4.89) (168.00) (2.75) (3.03)
Always −19.71** −12.55** −56.09 6.70* 5.23
(9.07) (5.40) (85.87) (3.47) (3.61)
No. of tracks (1–4) 16.32*** – 20.42 21.86*** 22.10***
(5.20) (42.75) (4.55) (4.52)
Sometimes × no. of tracks 3.34 2.93 −14.61
(2.40) (2.01) (84.57)
Always × no. of tracks 10.53*** 9.81*** 7.057
(3.58) (2.10) (42.07)
Parental background × No. of tracks 1.55 3.93**
(1.64) (1.58)
Parental background × No. of tracks × Sometimes −1.40**
(0.65)
Parental background × No. of tracks × Always −2.94***
(0.58)
Country FE – √ – – –
No. of students 126 233 126 233 126 233 126 233 126 233
No. of countries 21 21 21 21 21
The table presents coefficients from random effects models (standard errors in parenthesis) on the relation between student performance and parental
background, whether or not schools consider prior performance when selecting students and the number of tracks in a country. The superscripts *, ** and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The control variables are as described in the text. The models include imputation
dummies and imputation variable interaction terms.
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VII. Conclusion
The variation in tracking in education systems
throughout the Western world is quite large: Many
countries have no tracking in secondary school
(although most have some form of non-institutiona-
lized tracking), while some countries distinguish up
to five tracks for students. Also the manner in which
tracking is implemented on the school level differs
widely. Some countries put more emphasis on the use
of performance to place students into the available
tracks (e.g. the Netherlands), while in other countries
parents have more influence on the track their child
will go (e.g. Germany). We argue that the inconsis-
tencies in the empirical results found in the literature
could be explained by country differences in track
placement. When track placement is done not based
on an ability measure but mainly on PB, or, related,
residential areas, the theoretical benefits of tracking
might not arise. These theoretical benefits rely heavily
on the idea that tracking leads to more homogenous
ability classes which the teacher is better able to teach
and where students benefit from a curriculum tai-
lored to their needs and abilities. When students are
placed into tracks based not on prior performance but
on PB, classes will be more heterogeneous and stu-
dents might not be taught a fitting curriculum.
Furthermore, when PB is used to decide on track
placement, educational opportunities are affected
and inequality is likely to grow.
To study whether using performance to select
students into tracks has an effect on the relation
between tracking and student performance and edu-
cational opportunities, we use data of around
185 000 students in 31 comparable countries from
PISA 2009. Prior performance can be thought of as
an important measure of observed student ability.
Therefore, for schools having the information on
prior performance, it can help them allocate students
across tracks, allowing for a better match between
student ability level and track level which benefits
the student, both by allowing the student to learn
more and by limiting the effect of PB on student
performance. We show that tracking in general does
not have a direct relation with performance. On the
other hand, interactions between tracking and
whether schools consider prior performance reveal
that students in highly differentiated systems per-
form best when schools always take into account
prior performance to decide on student acceptance.
In systems with a low number of tracks, whether
schools consider prior performance has less of an
impact.
The association between PB, tracking and student
performance shows that equality of opportunity is
best provided for in a system with a high number of
tracks combined with schools always consider prior
performance on accepting the student to the school.
It turns out that for high-PB students in these sys-
tems, tracking weakens the positive relation between
PB and performance, whereas for low PB students
the (for them negative) relation between tracking
and performance is lowered primarily when they
attend schools that always consider prior perfor-
mance. Thus it seems that high-PB students might
be harmed by tracking when schools consider prior
performance. The result, that tracking does not
increase inequality of opportunity, if track placement
is based on prior achievement, has recently been
confirmed by Esser and Relikowski (2015). The
authors compare student outcomes in two German
states, one with strict assignment rules for track
placement and one with less strict rules, and since
they are able to control for prior achievement
directly, they exclude selection into schools.
We argue that it is not straightforward to deter-
mine whether tracking in itself has a positive or
negative effect on performance. When education
system characteristics are studied, it should be
taken into account that schools can have large influ-
ence on the implementation of these system charac-
teristics and thus heterogeneous effects across
schools can arise. We show that when tracking is
combined with whether schools consider prior per-
formance in accepting the student, tracking benefits
both student performance and educational
opportunities.
When more data become available in the future,
these findings could be replicated controlling for
individual prior performance (as Esser and
Relikowski 2015) and by including more elaborate
and specific information on the selection mechanism
with which students are selected into tracks.
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